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A s a first step in considering the foundations of Andre Malraux'stheory of art, it is useful to reflect on a general theoretical issue
which is not limited to Malraux in its application, but which is never-
theless vital to an understanding of his thinking. The issue is the
relationship between art and 'reality'---or, as the same idea is also
expressed at times, between art and 'the real world', or between art
and 'human experience', or between art and 'life'.
Once one begins to ask fundamental questions about art and its
purpose, the notion of 'reality', or 'the real world', or equivalents of
the kind just mentioned, usually makes an early appearance. It is
often suggested, for example, that art represents reality in some way,
or that it expresses some aspect of reality, or that it provides a certain
kind of knowledge about reality, or even, as some post-structuralist
theorists have argued, that art reaches out to reality but is never
quite able to grasp it. Much has been written for and against
propositions of this kind. Some theorists opt for representation,
some for expression, some for other alternatives. Irrespective of the
choice, however, a noteworthy feature of such discussions is that
attention usually fastens very quickly on the relationship between art
and reality-that is, whether it takes the form of representation,
expression or something else-without any sustained attempt to
explain what precisely one might mean by 'reality' in this context.
This question is typically discussed quite cursorily, if at all. Reality, it
often seems to be assumed, is a self-explanatory idea-loosely con-
ceived as something like 'the world we see and experience around us
every day'. In the words of one theorist, it is simply 'the actual
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world in which we live'. I Or as another puts it, reality is "the rest
of the world in which [aesthetic objects] exist".2 Reality or 'the
real world', it is implied, is an idea one can more or less take for
granted, moving quickly on to the more important question of
what kind of relationship art might bear to reality.
As a preliminary to discussing Malraux's theory of art (and
indeed to considering fundamental questions about art generally),
it is important to see why this approach is not satisfactory, and
why one needs to clarify the meaning of the concept 'reality', 'the
world', or their equivalents, in this context.
In a brilliant chapter in La Chartreuse de Parme, Stendhal
describes the rather unexpected reactions of his hero, the young
Fabrizio del Dongo, on the field of Waterloo. An ardent admirer
of Napoleon, Fabrizio has made his way onto the battlefield to
witness the unfolding of a glorious historical event. But somehow
the mighty spectacle he longs to see never materialises. Instead,
his attention is constantly caught by what seem to be irrelevant,
even absurd, details-like the dirtiness of the bare feet of the first
corpse he encounters, or the little black lumps of soil flung inex-
plicably into the air in a field nearby (kicked up, he realises soon
afterwards, by enemy cannon shot).
The scene is a masterly depiction of the yawning gulf between
an historical event in the historian's sense of the phrase, and the
perspectives of individual experience-that is, between 'reality'
for the historian, and the 'reality' of the individual's immediate
perceptions and emotions. The practised historian, whose
perspective is that of collective experience, might well be able to
furnish a convincing, even compelling, impression of the mighty
spectacle Fabrizio hoped to see; but the novelist, who is
committed to the portrayal of genuine individual experience (and
not just to fabricating that experience) discovers that the 'reality'
of the Battle of Waterloo is a corpse's dirty feet, and lumps of dirt
flung inexplicably into the air:' In short, 'reality' for the historian
seems to differ in a fundamental way from 'reality' for the novelist,
and the notion of reality seems suddenly to be subdividing before
our eyes. J The supposition that there is simply one undifferenti-
ated entity that one might satisfactorily describe as "the actual
world in which we live" or "the rest of the world in which




A further aspect of this issue merits consideration. When
concepts such as 'reality' or 'the real world' are employed in the
context of the theory of literature, or of art generally (as they often
are), are they intended to imply something that the mind has grasped
or comprehended in some way-or are they not? The difference can
be illustrated by sentences such as: "out of this chaos there emerged
a new reality" and "his schemes always foundered when they came
into contact with reality". In the first, the word, reality, suggests
something specific and identifiable-a particular set of circum-
stances that one might isolate and describe in some way. In the
second, however, that implication has faded from view and the word,
reality, now seems to signifY something far more amorphous-some-
thing one might describe merely as the unpredictable, uncontrol-
lable, brute facts of life, or in Shakespeare's phrase, "the thousand
natural shocks that flesh is heir to."
In the context of the theory of art, this difference in meaning is
far from a mere semantic quibble. If one wishes to argue, as many
theorists do, that part at least of the function of art is to achieve
a grasp on reality in some way, then it clearly makes a difference
whether or not one thinks that the tcrm 'reality' signifies something
that has already been grasped or comprehended in some form. If that
is the implication, the function of art begins to look as if it might be
supplementary, or secondary, in some way-a form of extra
knowledge placed on top of pre-existent knowledge already formu-
lated by some other means. If, however, 'reality' signifies something
roughly equivalent to the "unpredictable, uncontrollable 'brute facts'
of life", then art seems to have been assigned a much weightier
task-that of furnishing the primary shape and form to a 'reality' that
would otherwise, presumably, be mere anarchy and chaos. Here, in
short, is another level of complexity lurking beneath the surface of
the dcceptively bland term 'reality' and its various equivalents. One is
not only dealing with a term whose meaning seems to vary with the
area of intellectual endeavour in question (history or art, for
example), but also with one that harbours an ambiguity on an issue
that seems to have a direct bearing on the function and importance
one ascribes to art.
Enough has perhaps now been said to establish that in discussing
the relationship between art and reality, one cannot simply take the
idea of reality for granted, as so many theorists appear to do, or
dismiss it with cursory phrases of the kind mentioned earlier.
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The notion of reality in the context of art is not self-explanatory but
is, at best, a kind of conceptual shadow whose substance one needs
to identify and describe before it can be put to good explanatory
use. This point, as we shall now see, is of key importance when one
considers Andre Malraux's theory of art, because one quickly dis-
covers that the concept of reality, and what Malraux understands
the term to mean in the context of art, is of fundamental impor-
tance to his thinking.
What then does Malraux have in mind when he speaks of the
reality to which art is addressed? A passage of key importance in this
regard occurs in a major speech on the function of art that Malraux
delivered in '973, the text of which he later included in a work enti-
tled L(l Tete d'Obs;d;enne (translated into English under the title
Pkasso's Mask). In the course of this speech, Malraux speaks of what
he terms "the basic emotion man feels in the face of life, beginning
with his own". This basic emotion, he writes, springs from certain
fundamental questions. The question, "Why is it that something
exists rather than nothing?", he explains, leads on to the question,
"Why has life taken this particular form?" He then continues:
Anyone who has glimpsed the shores of death has, upon
his return, experienced the depth of that feeling. Most of
us have lelt it, undramaticalIy, when confronted with
other cultures: it makes the most commonplace of them
seem exotic. It is, undoubtedly, inseparable from the
passing of time; a simultaneous awareness of the strange,
the contingent, and the ephemeral.s
Malraux's meaning here becomes clearer if we relate it to the sphere
of religious belief, which has, in his view, been one of humanity'S
principal means of responding to the basic emotion he describes.
Civilisations with a strong religious sense, or even with a strong
attachment to a secular absolute of some kind, respond to the
question, "Why has life taken this particular form?", by providing an
explanat;on of things. The Christian, for example, replies that the
world is the way it is because it is God's Creation. A believer in a
secular absolute, such as the perfectibility of Man, might find the
explanation in the progressive unfolding of History. The specific
content of these responses is not important for present purposes.
The key point is that once an explanation is provided (and, of course,
genuinely believed), existence in general, and the existence of man in
particular, are rendered 'natural', in the sense of being there, and
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being the way they are,for a reason. Seen in this light, the world is as
it was intended to be, and man is 'at home' in the world, even if, as
Christianity and many other religions taught, the home is only
temporary, and frequented at times by various malevolent forces.
In the absence of such an absolute, however (and Malraux believes
this is essentially the case in what he terms our "agnostic" Western
culture today),~ there is no longer any explanation. Instead, one is left
face-to-face with the bewildering sense, expressed in the
"fundamental questions" to which Malraux refers, that everything
lacks a reason for being, or for being the way it is. The way things are,
including the most commonplace objects or events, seems no more
significant, definitive, or intended than any other way they might
possibly be. In place of the deep-seated conviction that has been
man's constant, reassuring companion for millennia, that the world is
the world, the only world, there is a strange sense of the arbitrariness
and contingency of things-as if the world and everything it contains
were no more than a fa~ade behind which might lurk unknown other
worlds. There is, in other words, no longer any possibility of 'going
behind' the phenomena of experience to justity or 'ground' them.
The world is apprehended solely in terms ofappearance -not appear-
ance in the sense of something behind which one might hope to dis-
cover a hidden reality (the way things 'really' are), but appearance
behind which nothing can be known: appearance per se, or in Malraux's
own phrase, "appearance in the metaphysical sense."] Unlike even the
humblest believer in an absolute-religious or otherwise-one is
no longer 'at home' in the world, but instead inhabits a universe
which seems, at bottom, mere formlessness and void, and in which
the presence or absence of man seems a matter of indifference.
Implicit in this, as Malraux points out, is a profound sense of the
ephemeral.~ The believing Christian, for example, knew that the
Gospel contained an 'imperishable' message-because it spoke of the
unchanging 'nature of things'-and he or she therefore knew that
actions carried out in obedience to that message, no matter how
insignificant they might appear, would partake of that imperisha-
bility. What is experienced now could merge with 'what once was' to
create a sense of timelessness-as the Angelus every evening recalled
the Annunciation, or Christmas signified a reliving of the birth of
Christ. Similarly, the committed revolutionary, for whom a particular
theory of history might reveal 'permanent truths' about man and his
ultimate destiny, knows that actions performed in accordance with
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those truths, even if of seemingly minor importance, will partake of
the revolution's enduring 'historical significance'. In the absence of an
absolute, however, there is no such assurance. Cut off from the
unchanging nature of things, one senses that the significance of all
human action, from simple daily tasks to the most ambitious under-
taking, is easy prey to the ravages of time. Man inhabits a universe in
which all action seems at risk of counting for nothing, and in which,
once again, human existence seems a matter of complete indifference.
These considerations lead one directly to the heart of Malraux's
thinking about the purpose of art. The "basic emotion man feels in
the face of life" discussed above is, in his view, as fundamental to art
as it is to the pursuit of an absolute. In the terminology of the earlier
discussion, it is the 'reality' to which art, as well as religion or a
secular absolute, respond. Not that Malraux is claiming, as commen-
tators have occasionally suggested,Y that art is a new absolute in the
sense in which that term is being used here. This is a misunder-
standing of his position that will be addressed below. Malraux is,
however, arguing that art, like religion or a secular absolute, is
addressed to the reality of the "basic emotion" in question-the
"simultaneous awareness of the strange, the contingent, and the
ephemeral". As one can immediately see, there is a vast distance
separating this from bland formulations of the kind quoted earlier
which suggest that reality, where art is concerned, can be adequately
described in phrases such as "the actual world in which we live" or
"the rest of the world in which [aesthetic objects} exist". For
Malraux, the reality to which art is addressed needs to be understood
against the background of the issues raised in the earlier parts of this
discussion: it is a reality experienced directly by the living individual
(albeit not as an individual, but in virtue of something shared with all
humanity), and a reality not in the sense of something endowed with
pre-existent meaning, but of something much closer to a sense of
anarchy and chaos. For Malraux, art is addressed to the realm of mere
appearance, in which the way things are seems no more significant
than any other way they might be, and in which the presence or
absence of man in the scheme of things seems a matter of no
consequence. The fundamental purpose of art is, and has always
been, to provide a defence against this reality-that is, to resist the
chaos of appearances and to assert man's presence. In a well-known,
though often misunderstood, statement in The Voices of Silence,
Malraux defines art as an "anti-destin"-an "anti-destiny"--or, as the
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line has been rendered, accurately enough, in English, "a revolt
against man's fate". J() The term "destin" here is not, as some critics
have implied, a lapse into mystification. II It is Malraux's shorthand,
as it were, for the sense of "counting for nothing" in the scheme of
things analysed above, art being one of the ways, in his view, that
humanity defends itself against destiny thus understood.
How docs art achieve this? It may be useful here to draw a compar-
ison with the thinking behind some of the more familiar claims of
Western aesthetics. If one thinks of art in terms of traditional con-
cepts such as mimesis, representation or expression, the entity
denoted by terms such as 'reality' or 'the world', or sometimes 'nature',
is usually understood as a basic reference point, or guide, to which the
artist must remain faithful if a successful work of art is to result-
whether this fidelity finds expression through the naturalism of, say, a
Chardin or a Courbet, or through the quite different style of, say. a
Cezanne or a Picasso (to choose examples from visual art). Malraux's
argument constitutes a radical challenge to this theoretical schema.
Far from being a reference point or guide, reality. for Malraux, as we
are now in a position to see, is that against which art seeks to provide a
defence, and a key feature of his account of art is his consistent and
unambiguous rejection of traditional approaches of the kind just men-
tioned, even if proffered by artists themselves. "Whatever the artist
himself may say on the matter", he writes in The J;Oices ofSilence, "never
does he let himself be mastered by the outside world; always he
subdues it to something he puts in its stead".'~
What is this "something he puts in its stead"? It is, Malraux
answers unequivocally, "another world-not necessarily a supernal
world, or a glorified one, but one different in kind from that of
reality".'~The "difference in kind" lies precisely in the elimination of
destiny-that is, in the elimination of everything belonging merely
to the chaos of appearances, and the creation in its stead of a world
which, in Malraux words, is "scaled down to man's measure-and {in
which} the outside world loses its autonomy".IJ In the case of visual
art, for example, "the visible world" is, at most, Malraux writes, a
"dictionary"-an assemblage of separate clements, individually
capable of being invested with meaning, but combined in a manner
that renders them incoherent--{)r "more accurately", Malraux writes,
"the way in which they arc assembled, their syntax, is not that of
art".I~ Thus, he writes, "However complex, however lawless an art
may claim to be-even the art of a Van Gogh or a Rimbaud-
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it stands for unity as against the chaos of appearances".lh Art func-
tions, he asserts, "by wresting forms from the world which has man
at its mercy, and transposing them into the world in which he is
supreme-by changing destiny into significance".17 It is a world con-
structed of those elements on which the artist has been able to
impose meaning while excluding those he cannot. This is why the
term "conquest" recurs frequently in Malraux's account of art, and
why a prominent theme in his theory of art is the link between art
and the "dignity of man"-Ieading him to write in The lIoices ofSilence,
for example, that "an art museum is one of the places that shows man
at his noblest".lx For Malraux, art is a human creation with a quite
specific purpose: it has nothing to do with the representation of
reality-however broadly one likes to interpret the term "representa-
tion"-its purpose is the creation of another world, and in doing so
asserting man's presence in a universe in which his existence seems a
matter of indifference.
If one now thinks back to the earlier discussion, one can see why
it would be a mistake to claim that Malraux regards art as a new
absolute-a kind of secular religion-in the sense in which these
terms have been used above. A religion, or a secular absolute, as
indicated, involves an affirmation about the nature of things. It
implies that the form of the world is the only form it could have,
since, as the handiwork of a higher power, it is the form it was
intended to have. Art as Malraux understands it makes no such affir-
mation. Art, as he says, "stands for unity as against the chaos of
appearances", but does not affirm that appearance is merely an illu-
sion beneath which lies a permanent and universal reality, or truth.
Art, in short, makes the world one, but does not, like a religion,
affirm that there is only one world. I') Both art and religion certainly
seek to combat what Malraux terms "destiny", but art does so not by
vanquishing it once and for all as an absolute does, but by a continual
struggle in the face ofit. Art is a "revolt against man's fate", but at no
point can it claim a definitive victory.
These comments on Malraux's theory of art have been limited to
one aspect of his thinking only-though the claim here is that it is a
fundamental aspect. The notion of art as an "anti-destiny" is the key
insight, the fundamental, generative idea, so to speak, that underlies
the theory of art Malraux goes on to develop. There is much more to
be said about that theory, and the purpose of Malraux's extensive
writings on art is to explore those implications in depth. They
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include, for example, issues such as the nature of the creative
process, the relationship between art and history, the significance of
the notion of beauty (which, for Malraux, relates to an experience of
art that has now lost its hold on us), and, above all, the vexed but
crucial question of the relationship between art and time, where,
arguably, Malraux makes one of his most fascinating, original, and
truly illuminating contributions to the theory of art.
Yet even without examining those matters, and confining one's
attention to the issues discussed here, one can see why Malraux's
theory of art is worthy of close attention. A key aspect of his theory
is that he gives'us a way of conceptualising the basic human purpose
of art-an issue which aesthetics has in recent times, and certainly in
the Anglo-American sphere, tended to shy away from. Moreover, the
purpose Malraux assigns to art is far from peripheral. Malraux has
suggested that to ask the question, "What is art?", is also, by implica-
tion, to raise the question "What is man?",1l One may perhaps feel
that such implications are often rather distant in much contempo-
rary aesthetics, but they are nonetheless very close at hand in
Malraux's own case. Malraux approaches art in terms of fundamental
human responses to existence-in terms of what he calls "the basic
emotion man feels in the face of life, beginning with his own". The
purpose he assigns to art is as fundamental-as 'metaphysical', if one
likes-as those questions: it is, he argues, one of the ways man
responds to that basic emotion, and has done so since the dawn of
human history. A theory of art framed in those terms-particularly
when presented as powerfully and in such a well-informed way as
Malraux presents it-merits our close attention.
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